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In the SupreJDe Court
of the State of Utah

JESS JIMENEZ,
Ptaimtiff and

Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7264

RAY O'BRIEN and BOYD BYRON
BROADWATER,
Defendant's and
Avpellamts.

STATEMENT OF FACT'S
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of
Appellant is not complete and does. not fairly present to
the court the complete factual picture. We, therefore,
desire to supplement the statement of the Appellant with
the following additional facts:
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The accident in which the Appel~ant was injured
occurred on July 9, 1945. Appellant was first taken to
the Salt Lake General Hospital and within a few hours
was removed to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City.
Jimenez was treated by Dr. Stewart A. Wright, a NeuroSurgeon. (R. 245). At the time Dr. Wright first examined Jimenez, which was on the day of the accident,
Jimenez was unconscious. (R. 245). Mr. Jimenez's injury was diagnozed as ''a brain contusion severe in
type.'' (R. 246). Jimenez remained unconscious for a
period of from two to two and one half weeks. The
length of his period of unconsciousness is indicative of
the severity of the injury which he sustained. (R. 248).
Although Jimenez gradually improved after the
eighth or tenth day, he was not fuNy recoverd when he
left the hospital on August 14th. It was the opinion of
Dr. Wright that Jimenez had sustained a permanent
brain injury. The basis of this opinion was that Jimenez
remained unconscious from two to two and one half
weeks. Dr. Wright explained that nerve cells of the
brain were destroyed and when a certain part of them
are destroyed, they are not replaced by others and ''scar
tissue forms; that the nerve cells which carry on the
primary function of the brain do not re-generate or reproduce." (R. 250-251). As to the a'bility of Jimenez
to reason on August 14, 1945, Dr. Wright testified that
he did not think the man was able to reason normally;
that if he had been able to reason normally he would not
have over-ridden the Doctor's objection to his leaving
the hospital after a severe brain injury. (R. 136).
\
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)[rs. Loy, a friend of Jiinenez, testified that after
Jimenez was taken to St. :J[ark's Hospital, it was between two and three weeks before he knew anybody or
could recog-nize anyone. ( R. 266). She further testified
that after Jin1enez regained consciousness, sometimes
he was Yery rational and recognized his friends and at
other times he would not recognize his friends and would
not recall their having visited him. During these irrational periods, Jimenez would accuse his friends of having neglected him even though they might have visited
him earlier on the same day. (R. 226).
Physical appearance of Jimenez was had and he had
a hard time talking, stammering and stuttering. (R.
227). On several occasions he told Mrs. Loy that he
had a gun under his bed and had shot some pigeons. He
told her to take the pigeons home. He also thought that
the doctor and the hospital were trying to run his bill
up to make more money. He wasn't even able to feed
himself, but he still thought he was well and should go
home.
After Jimenez was out of the hospital and while he
was still a sick man, he insisted on calling on Mrs. Loy,
i.nstead of remaining home in bed. His appearance and
manner were considerably changed. His dress was untidy and he was generally unkempt, whereas, prior to
the injury he had been neat in his dress and appearance.
He had bought three copies of the same issue of a magazine and he bought clothes which were far too small for
him to wear. (R. 230).
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

After he was out of the hospital, Jimenez was unable
to walk in a normal manner; walking in a stagger, similar
to that of a drunken person. His nerves were badly
frayed and he could not stand noises of any sort. He
was depressed, changeable and moody. Fr·equently he
changed his plans between going away to a distant state
and remaining in Salt Lake City. (H. 231). ·The same
changeability was manifested in Jimenez's opinion of his
children. On one day he would think them complete1y
had and on the next day would think them the most
wonderful children in the world. He was also very emotional at thi~ time and easily provoked to weeping and
crying, and his memory was very bad after the accident,
as compared to what it had been before.
Dr. Garland H. Pace, a physician specializing in
Neurology and Psychiatry testified that Jimenez suffered a permanent brain damage from his accident and
per1nanent damage to his personality structure.
We also invite the court's attention to the fact that
Jimenez signed both of the releas-es, that is, the release
of August 14, 1'94!5 and that of September 5, 1945, Exhibit Numbers 5 and 6, as "Gimenez." In other words,
Jimenez did not ·even correctly spe1l his own name on
the day he signed the releases.
We also invite the court to compare the handwriting of Jimenez on the releases with his handwriting on
Exhibit H, which is a sample of his handwriting taken
in the court at the time of trial. Although counsel stipulated in open court that the signatures on the releases
were those of Jimenez, Jimenez himself did not think he
4
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signed the last name of the signature Ly remwn of the
mis-spelling thereof. (R. 230). He had no recollection
of writing the words in his handwriting on the release
form.
Jimenez could not even re1nen1ber whether l\Irs.
Gounis, his ex-wife, 'vas with him at the time the second
re1ease was executed. (R. 335.) Jimenez further testified that he did not recall ever having s·een :Mr. Ben
Duncan while he was at the hospital, although :Mr. Duncan had visited him numerous times and had procured his
signature on the releases. Jimenez did remember the
name, but not the person. Jimenez had no recollection
of any conversations with Duncan but he did recall signing a paper but wasn't sure what it was. (R. 340). Jimenez had no recollection of a transcribed statement by
him which was taken in question and answer form by
Mrs. Pannier, shorthand reporter. (R. 34;5).
We also invite the court's attention to the fact that
almost from the very date of injury, Ben Duncan, the
insurance adjuster for the Farmers Inter-Insurance Exchange ''camped'' on the trail of Jimenez. The first
time he called at the hospital was on July 13th, four
days after the accident. The plaintiff, Jimenez, was
under the influence of sedatives and incapable of carrying on a conversation (R. 382). However, Duncan called
again a few days later and continued to call until he finally succeeded in obtaining from Jimenez a release, on
August 14, 1'945, the date when Jimenez was released
from the hospital. Al~ in all, Duncan made six or seven
visits. (R. 383).

5
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CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The respondent cross assigns as error the following
orders and rulings of the court:
1. The court erred in sustaining the def·endant's
objections to the following question to Dr. Stewart A.
Wright, an expert medical witness:
Q. "Doctor, do you have an opinion whether
or not on August 14, 1945, Jess Jimenez had the
Inental faculty or whether his mental faculties
were so deficient or impaired that he did not
have sufficient power to comprehend the sub-.
ject of a contract, its nature, and its probable
consequences, and to act with discretion with relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary
affairs of life~" (R. 225).
2. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's
objection to the following hypothetical question to Dr.
Pace, a n1edical expert:
Q. ''All right, medicaHy unconscious for a
period of two to two and a half weeks: that upon
losing his status of being medically unconscious
that he was unable to feed himself for a short
period thereafter in ·excess of a week; that he
was kept and was medicated with opiates during
the period; assuming that the spinal fluid was
tapped and showed the presence of blood in the
spinal fluid; assuming .that he told his friends
and relatives during the period of his consciousness that he had a gun under his bed and asked
them to take the pigeons he had killed home;
assuming that he complained of pain in his head
upon regaining consciousness; assuming that he
evidenced a desire to 1eave the hospital and assuming also that contrary to his physician's advice and against his physician's wishes he did
6
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leaYe the hospital on .August 14, 1~)45; assuming
that after he left the hospital he was seen to walk
in a manner indicative or comparable to the way
a drunken man would walk; assuming he was
upon occasion inclined to weep during the month
immediately succeeding his release frmn the hospital, and he complained of dizziness, lack of sleep,
extreme fatigue, headaches; do you have an
opinion as an expert in pyschiatry, that is Inedically sound, in your opi~ion, and based further
upon your examination of the patient, as you haYe
stated, as to whether or not on the 14th day of
~\.ugust 1945, Jess Jimenez had the menta1 faculties to be aware of the meaning of an act of signing a release on that date; do you have such an
opinion 1''
3. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's
objection to the hypothetical question to Dr. Pace, as
follows:
Q. ''Dr. Pace, I am going to ask you a hypothetical question, and for the purpose of it I wish
you to adopt certain facts as being true. Those
facts are as follows: A'ssume, Doctor, that a male,
age 38, did on the 6th day of July, 1945, suffer
a ·brain contusion as a result of an automobile
accident; that he was hospitalized for such injury, and that the spinal fluid was tapped, showing the presence of blood; assume that this male
was unconscious for a period of from two to two
and a half weeks during which time he was fed
through the veins; as&ume after that period he
regained consciousness and was medicated with
opiates and sedatives, and that for approximately
two weeks after gaining consciousness he could
not feed himself; that during his period in the
hospital, after he had re_gained consciousness, he
to1d a friend that he had a gun under his bed and

7
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had killed ·pigeons with it and during that period
he remonstrated with the friend for not coming
to see him, when the fact was that the friend had
visited him daily; assume, doctor, that during the
period that this male of the age of 38 was in the
hospital and that on the 14th day of August; assume, doctor, he did leave the hospital against the
specific advice of his physician; assume further,
doctor, that after he left the hospital and until
the month of November, 1945, he was observed
by a friend to waik with a stagger, to weep easily;
that this 1nan complained of noise, dizziness and
inability to sleep and easy and intense fatigue;
that he presented an untidy appearance, and made
purchases during this period of wearing apparel
that obviously did not fit him; assume also, doctor, that on the 14th day of August, 1945, whi1e
still in the hospital he signed a release, given to
an adjuster for an insurance company, the terms
of which were to release the company, the person
which that company insured from all liability for
damages as a result of the accident and injury
and that on September 15th of that year he executed another release;
THE COURT : September 5th:
Q. September 5th. Assume that he receiveda consideration of one thousand dollars on the
execution of the first release, plus the payment of
his hospital and medical expenses to that date;
assume that he received as a consideration for
execution of the second release the nomina'l sum,
less than fifty dollars.
Do you have an opinion, doctor, which opinion
is reasonably medically certain as to whether or
not that person at the time he executed those
releases had the mental faculty sufficient to un-

8
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derstand the nature and consequences of his
acts.''
±. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's
objection to that portion of the deposition of Dr. Rosenbloom, wherein he was asked to state whether or not
on August 14, 19±5, Jimenez would have sufficient 1nental
power to comprehend the subject of a contract and its
nature and the probable consequences to his rights. (R.
358-359).
5. The court erred in excluding from evidence a
portion from Page 15 of Dr. Rosenbloom's deposition.
(R. 370-371).
6. The court erred in excluding from evidence those
matters offered by the plaintiff and contained in their
offer of proof. (R. 439-441, inclusive).
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As pointed out in the Appellant's brief, there is no
question in this case as to the liability of the defendant
to the plaintiff. The only issues before the court and
the only ones to which we shall address ourselves are
those relating to the validity of the releases executed by
the plaintiff on August 14th and September 5th, 1945,
and as to whether the plaintiff was under an obligation
to refund or tender to the defendant the amount he had
received under his release before commencing this action. We shall also treat briefly the question raised by
our cross assignments of error, namely, whether the
medical experts should have been permitted to give

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

their opinion as to the mental capacity of the plaintiff
on the dates when the releases were executed.
POINT I.
THERE IS SUFFI1CIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO JUSTIFY A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT
ON AUGUST 14, 1945, AND ON SEPTEMBER 5,
1945, THE DATES WHEN THE RELEASES WERE
EXECUTED, THAT JIMENEZ LACKED SUFFICIENT MENTAL CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND
WHAT HE WAS DOING, AND WAS INCOMPETENT
TO ENTER INTO A VALID AND BINDING AGREEMENT OF ANY SORT.

We ~ave, under our statement of facts, detailed considerable evidence omitted from Appellant's brief, relating to the capacity of the p1aintiff at the time the releases were executed. Although the court refused to permit the various medical experts who were called by the
plaintiff to give their expert opinions as to Jimenez's
mental capacity on the dates when the releases were
executed, we believe there is sufficient evidence, both
n1edical and lay, to warrant a finding of incapacity on the
part of Jimenez, at the time the releases were executed.
'Ye have no quarrel with the rule of Anderson vs. O.S.L.,
47 Utah 614, 155 Pac. 446, cited and quoted in the appellant's brief, Pages 11 and 12, to th'e effect that a settlement agreement is binding on the parties and in the absence of fraud or concea1ment the release must not be
set aside. However, that is only a general rule, and
the release, like any other contract, is voidable if one
of the parties thereto lacked contractual capacity at the
time the release was executed. Nor do we have any dispute with the rule stated in Hatch vs. Hatch, 148 Pac.
433, 46 Utah 218, wherein it is said that:

10
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"In ordinary contracts the test is, were the
mental faculties so deficient or hnpaired th&.t
there was not sufficient power to c01nprehend
the subject of the contract, its nature and its
probable consequences, and to act with discretion in relation thereto, or with relation to the
ordinary affairs of life~''
That rule has since been followed in many subsequent Utah cases. However, it is our contention that
in this case, the evidence is sufficient to supp9rt a finding of fact that the mental faculties of Jimenez were, at
the time the releases were entered into, so deficient and
impaired that he lacked the menta~ power to comprehend
the subject matter of the contracts, their nature, and
their probable consequences, and to act~th discretion in
relation thereto or with relation to the ordinary affairs
of life. In the leading case of Umion Pacific Railway_
Company vs. Barris, 1'58 U. S. 326, 39 L. Ed. 1003, it
held that where in an action for personal injuries
the defendant sets up a written release of all claims for
damages, signed by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, in
denying its execution, sets up that it was signed by him
in· ignorance of its contents at a time when he was

was

under great suffering from his injuries and in a state approaching to unconsciousness caused by his injuries, the
case is one for the jury under proper instructions from
the court.
As to whether the plaintiff had sufficient mental
capacity at the time the release was ·entered into, in
Kennedy vs. R~aby, (Olda.), 50 Pac. 2nd, 716, the court
11
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quoted with approval from St. Louis_and San Ftrfh'YIIcisco
Railway Company vs. Reed, 37 Okla. 350, 132 Pac. 355,
358 as follows:
"Litigants who do not desire the good faith
of their acts questioned should not use such unseemingly haste in their efforts to escape liability
on account of admitted wrongful acts * * *."
The court further said at page 710:
''As was intimated in the Reed Case, supra,
when litigants visit the bedside of an injured
party in order to settle with her (him) before the
surgical dressing has been removed, they should
not be surprised when the courts permit their
methods to be investigated. We therefore hold
that the question of the validity of said release
was properly submitted to the jury.''
In Jordom v. Guer11a, 23 Cal. 2d 469, 144 P. 2d 349,
352, the court said :
''It is the province of the jury to determine
whether the circumstances furnished the opportunity for overreaching, whether the defendant or
his agent took advantage of it, and whether the
plaintiff was thereby misled. In reviewing the
case the evidence must be regarded in the light
most favorable to the jury's conclusion."
Further,
'' 'And in passing on the validity of such
releas·e, when assailed, an surrounding conditions
should be fully developed, and the relative attitudes ·of the contracting parties clearly shown.
So that the jury, in the clear light of the whole
truth, may rightly decide which story bears the
impress of verity'."

12
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It is interesting to note that the insurance company
which was involved in the Guerra case is the srune one
defending the case at bar.
In the recent Idaho case of Estes v. Magee, 109 P.
2d 631, the court said at page 635:
"Conceding appellant is correct that to overthrow the release the evidence 1nust be clear,
satisfactory and convincing, this court has held
that neverthe1ess the court, sitting without a jury
as the trier of fact is the one to determine the
weight of the evidence as coming up to such standard, if there is competent evidence to that effect.''
" 'The trial court is the appropriate tribunal
to weight the evidence, and determine whether it
is convincing and satisfactory, within the meaning of the rule. It has been said that in such
cases, as in others, the determination of that
court in favor of either party upon conflicting or
contradictory evidence is not open to review in
the appellate court'." Wright v. Rosebaugh, Supra, (46 Ida. 526, 2'69 Pac. 98) ('Sic). 0 'regan et
al v. Henderson, 'Supra (46 Ida. 76!1, 27'1 Pac. 423)
(Sic). Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Ida. 546, 551, 290 Pac.
205, 207, 79 ALR 934.
The rules above stated have been followed by the
Utah Court. In McLaughlin v. Chief Cons~o;l. Mitwing Oo.
et al., 62 Ut. 532, 220 Pac. 726, 733, the court said:
"It is argued that the undisputed evidence
shows conclusively that the release was valid in
every way, and that no fraud was committed in
its procurement. On this proposition the evidence was conflicting. It is not for us to judge
its weight nor to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.''

13
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And again:
"The jury passed upon the conflicting evidence, and, having by its verdict found in favor
of plaintiff, that finding must be left undisturbed.
\Vhen in a 'law case the evidence is conflicting and
the court has denied a motion for new trial, the
judgment must stand.''
The above statement of the rule was quoted with approval in Brown v. Union Padific Railroad Conv,pany,
86 Ut. 475, 290 Pac. 759, and the court further said in
that case:
''The evidence in this case was conflicting.
It was the duty of the court to submit the case to
the jury. The jury saw and heard all the witnesses and believed the plaintiff had been imposed
on. The trial court, having seen and heard the
witness·es, did not feel justified, although it had
the power, to set aside the verdict because it was
against the evidence. We, who have only read
the record of the trial and proceedings, are asked
to say that the jury and the trial judge did not
do their duty. This we are unwilling to do. The
appellant had a fair trial, and the trial court
committed no errors. * * * The judgment must be
sustained.''
The various cases cited by the appellant are not
in conf!lict with the rules above quoted. We think no
useful purpose can be suhserved by analyzing in detail
the facts of thos·e cases. As ohserved by Mr. Justice
Thurman in the case of Dovich v. Chief Consol}idated
~711ining Compam;y, 53 Utah 522, 174 Pac. 627, 631, "Every
case must be decided upon its own facts.'' It may 'be
said generally that all of the cases cited by appellant are
14
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substantially different on their facts fron1 the case at
bar, and in all of them, entirely different questions were
involved. It may also be observed that in practicaNy all
of those cases the person charged with mental incompetence was a person of advanced years, suffering from
some degree of senility, and in 1nost of those cases, incompetency was sought to be established largely -on the
basis of old age and defective men10ry. It is sub1nitted
that in the case at bar, the evidence is entirely different.
The testimony of Jimenez himself, together with that of
the doctor who attended hun, and his friend, Mrs. Loy,
who· visited him frequently and regularly during his
confinement in the hospital, shows that Jimenez was suffering from marked and serious mental aberration; and
that he was under hallucinations and confused impressions, an as a result of the injuries sustained by him
in the automobile collision.
It may be further said of the cases cited by the appellant that most of them were ·equity cases and hence subject to review on the facts as well as on the law by the
reviewing court. There is no question in this case that
the action was at law; and the verdict, being supported
by credible evidence, must be sustained, even though the
court might come to a different conclusion on the facts.
We invite the court's attention to the fact that the
jury was very thoroughly and adequately instructed that
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show by a
preponderance of the evidence, and by evidence which
was clear, convincing, and unequivocal that plaintiff
lacked suficient menta[ capacity at the time both releases

15
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were signed. See instructions Numbers 4-10, inclusive.
The jury was also very thoroughly instructed as to the
natur.e of mental incapacity which would invalidate the
releases. All of instructions Numbers 4-10 were very
favorable to the defendant and presented defendant's
theory to the jury in the best possible light. Particular
attention is invited to the first paragraph of Instruction
Number 7, which reads as follows:
''To avoid a release from liability for personal injuries, the plaintiff in this case, Jess
Jimenez, has the burden, of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the invalidity of each
release ·by clear and unequivocal and convincing
evidence ; otherwise the releases and settlement
are binding upon plaintiff and constitutes a complete defense.''
The evidence in this case is sufficient to support the
finding of the jury and the judgment of the trial court
should not be disturbed.
POINT II.
THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RETURN TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY, NOR
TENDER TO.THE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE
AMOUNT OF MONEY RECEIVED IN SETTLEMENT
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A RATIFICATION OF
THE RELEASE.

The modern view as enunciated in the better reasoned cases is to the effect that a p~aintiff who has executed a release of all claims need not return nor tender
return of the moneys received by him when a release is
void or voidable. ·To support their position appellants
have resurrected from the musty tomes of the dead past,
two ancient decisions which apparently support the posi-
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tion contended for by then1. The modern cases support
the view that a plaintiff need not return moneys received
by him. It is sufficient that any amount which he has
received be deducted from the judgment. The- modern
view is well stated in A tchi8on, T o1peka & S anJta Fe Railro·ad Company vs. Peterson. (Ariz.) 271 Pac. 406·:
'• It is claimed, further, that a return of the
$1,000 paid for the release, or a tender thereof,
was a condition precedent to appeHee's right to
bring the action, and that, inasmuch as this was
not done, the cause cannot be maintained. There
is, it is true, a difference in the decisions on this
proposition; but the weight of authority, as well
as the better reasoning~ is that, where the release
was secured through fraud, repayment of the
consideration therefor, or a tender thereof, is
not a requisite to the maintenance of the action.
Some of the decisions base their ruling upon the
ground that it would be useless to require a tender
where it would be refused, as in the case of the
releasee who claims that the release is valid, while
others place it upon the ground that the restoration of that which one is entitled to retain in any
event, either as a result of the agreement sought
to be set aside or of the original liability, is never
required. Both of these grounds are app1icable
here, for the reason that appellant insists that the
release given by appellee is valid, and the court
gave it credit on the judgment ror the $1,000 paid
therefor.''
The same view is followed in the later Arizona case
of Southern Pacific Oo~. v. Gastelum, 283 Pac. 719. The

Aiizona case was also fdllowed in Estes v. Magee (Idaho)
109 P. 2d 631, where the court said:
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''Where, as in this case, the party rescinding
would be entitled to retain the money received
even though the settlement agreement be set
aside, the law does not require the return of the
money paid in settlement, since the same result
can be accomplished h~, crediting the amount paid
in partial satisfaction of the judgment.''
To the same effect see K enned;y v. Raby,
(Okla.) 50 P. 2d 716; Farmers Bank & Trust
Cmnpany v. Public Service Company of Indiana,
13 Fed. Supp. 548; Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d
-±69, 144 P. 2d 349; Thorne v. Co1umbia Cab Co.,
3 N.Y.S. 2d 537. The same view has been followed
by the Utah Court. Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53,
192 Pac. 624; McLaughlin v. Chief Consol. ~fining
Co., 62 Utah 532, 220 Pac. 726.
In this case the defendant relies on the releases executed by the plaintiff and insisted and still insists that
said releases are valid. It is apparent that any tender
of repayment by the plaintiff would have been rejected
and the law will not require a useless act. Moreover,
plaintiff was entitled in any event to the amount which
he had received under the terms of the release, and there
was no reason for him to make a tender back. Defendant's insurance carrier has not been prejudiced since the
amount paid at the time the releases were signed was
deducted from the amount of the verdict.

POINT III.
THE rCOURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
THE VARIOUS MEDICAL EXPERTS WHO TESTIFIED ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE
THEIR EXPERT OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR
NOT THE PLAINTIF WAS MENTALLY SOUND AT
THE TIME THE RELEASES WERE EXECUTED.
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Under this point we shaU discuss the issue reached
by our cross-assignments of error. It is with the utmost reluctance that we treat this point at all. We are
convinced that the position maintained by us under Point
I and Point II is correct. And if the court rules as w~
contend it should under Points I and II, there is no
need to consider Point III. However, in order to fully
protect the rights of the plaintiff in this case, we feel
that it is our duty to bring this issue to the attention of
the court. We hope that our doing so will not be constr-ued as a confession of weakness of our position on
the merits of Points I and II.
It is, of course, a general rule that a witness may not
give his conclusion as to the ultimate fact to be found by
the jury. However, there is a well recognized exception
to this rule in the case of experts, partimrlarly medical
experts. The doctors who testified for the plaintiff in
this case would have testified, if permitted by the court,
that the plaintiff was at the time the r~eleases were executed, mentally unsound and that he did not have sufficient capacity to enter into, or understand the nature
of the transaction into which he was entering.
In Callaham v. Feldman (Colo.), 11 P. 2d 217, a psychiatrist was permitted to base opinions that the testator
was sane upon all evidence adduced at trial. To the
same effect see In Re Swam/s Estate, (Utah), 170 Pac.
452.
In w,ooten v. DTagon Consol. Milnilng Co., (Utah) 181
Pac. 593, it was held that an expert's opinion as to the
fact in issue was not an invasion of the jury's province.
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In Hellamd v. Bridenstine (Wash.), 104 Pac. 6'26, it
was held that the fact that a hypothetical question asked
of a medical expert witness embodied the very fact that
was ultimately to be found by the jury, did not render
the question incompetent. In the case at bar there is no
dispute as to the qualifications of the medical experts.
The necessary foundation for the questions was laid and
the hypothetical questions stated were based upon facts
in evidence at the trial. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to permit the witnesses to answer, and by so ruling, the trial court committed error prejudicial to the
plaintiff.
In the event that the court should ho~d that the evidence admitted was insufficient to support a finding of
mental incompetence on the part of the plaintiff at the
time the releas·es were executed, then at least the plaintiff should have the opportunity for a new trial and the
opportunity to have presented to the jury the expert
opinions of the doctors.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing argument w.e conclude:
1. That the question of whether or not plaintiff
was competent at the time the releases were executed
was a question of fact for the jury, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that
the plaintiff was mentally incompetent at the time the
releases were executed.
2. The fact that the plaintiff did not return to the
insurance company the amount of money paid in consideration of the exe_cution of the releases did not amount
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to a ratification of the release. Plaintiff was under no
obligation to make tender of the n1oney back, and the
rights of the insurance company wer·e adequately protected by deduction from the verdict of the amount paid
by the insurance company.
There being no errors of law prejudicial to the defendant, the judgm·ent of the trial court should be affirmed.
3. If, however, the court should be of the opinion
that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
mental incapacity on the part o£ the plaintiff at the
time the releases were executed, then a new trial should
be granted with directions to the trial court to permit
medical experts, properly qualified, to testify as to their
opinion of the p~aintiff's mentai capacity or incapacity
at the time the releases were executed.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLISTER, CALLISTE·R, & LEWIS,
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN, of cownsel

.A.tto·rneys fo'r Plairntiff a.nd
Respond,ent, Jess Jimenez.
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